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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic THE

SUPREME

COURT'S LICENSE FOR DOMESTIC TERRORISM

"They once came in the night, wearing white hooded robes and
brandishing fiery crosses, proclaiming that God was pro-white
and on their side. Now they come in the morning, wearing suits
and carrying incendiary posters, proclaiming that God is pro-life
and on their side."
INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, militant antiabortion groups, religious zealots,
and radical conservative factions have dramatically increased their efforts
to prevent women from exercising their constitutional right to an abortion. 2 The level of violence has escalated rapidly,3 culminating in,the
March 1993 shooting death of Dr. David Gunn, who performed legal abor4
tions at a health clinic in Florida.
The violence continues unfettered. Clinics are besieged by angry
mobs and each day doctors and patients face physical and verbal assault. 5
Firebombs, death threats, and shootings have replaced reasoned debate in
the anti-abortion crusade. 6 State laws against trespass, harassment, and
interference have proven insufficient and ineffective in fighting these ter7
rorist attacks.
1. Constance A. Morella, Clinics Under Siege, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1993, at A21.
2. The right to abortion was established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe
decision evolved from the Supreme Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (holding that the "right of privacy... is a legitimate one") and Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), (holding that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child").
3. From 1977 to 1990, there were 829 cases of abortion violence. This violence included bombings, arson, shootings, death threats, assault and battery, clinic invasions, burglaries, kidnappings, and vandalism. See Brief for the National Abortion Federation and
Planned Parenthood Federation of America at 4-5, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985); see also FAVE D. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVEs 50
(1989); Mimi Hall, Abortion Fight Takes Deadly Turn - Viwlent Tactics on the Increase,USA TODA,
Mar. 11, 1993, at 3A.
4. See Sandra G. Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike at Doctors' Home Lives-Illegal Intimidation
or Protected Protest?, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al, A17.
Five months after the slaying of Dr. David Gunn, a doctor in Witchita, Kansas, was shot
by a woman who had sent fan mail to Dr. Gunn's assassin. Seth Faison, Abortion Doctor
Wounded Outside Kansas Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1993, at A12; see also Tanya Melich, The
War on Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1993, at A25.
5. See Paul Solotaroff, Surviving the Crusades, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 14, 1993, at 57; Felicia R. Lee, Abortion Battle Lines Drawn in New Yor*-Debate Rages On Outside of Clinics, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1993, at B1.

6. See, e.g., Eloise Salholz, The Death of Doctor Gunn, NEwswEEx, Mar. 22, 1993, at 34.
7. Due to the ineffectiveness of state laws and law enforcement, women and clinics
have turned to federal laws, which allow clinics to obtain injunctions valid over entire counties, rather than the case-by-case relief obtainable under most state laws. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Says Klan Law Can't Block Abortion Blockades, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 14, 1993, at
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In an effort to stem the tide of violence, clinics have looked to the
courts to enjoin groups such as Operation Rescue from continuing their
lawless acts of force, intimidation, and harassment. Most recently, plaintiffs have attempted to invoke § 1985(3)8 of the Reconstruction Era Ku
Klux Klan Act 9 to establish a private, class-based conspiracy. Historically,
§ 1985(3) has had a limited application. The Supreme Court has consistently narrowed the intended scope of the statute by imposing a state action requirement, 10 by creating a class-based animus prerequisite, 1 and
by restricting the classes of individuals that can rely on it as a federal remedy. 12 Recently, however, several circuit courts have found that congressional intent and statutory language dictate that § 1985(3) protection can
and should be applied broadly and, in particular, to women seeking abor3
tion services.'
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court does not agree. In
4
January 1993, the Court held in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic'
that women seeking abortions are not a "class" to be protected by federal
law. 15 Bray is the most recent step in the Court's attempt to limit the
scope and application of § 1985(3). This decision will have a debilitating
effect on the statute and its ability to remedy the modern-day conspiracies
that mirror the violence and intimidation faced by blacks in 1871.16
Al; Ruth Walker, A Long Shadow Across Roe v. Wade, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 20, 1993, at
18; An Assault on Women's Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1993, at 14.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) provides in part that:
[i]f two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or
hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons... the equal protection of the laws; ... the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) was passed as H.R. 320 under the title of "Act to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment" and is now known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. The Act was enacted in
response to the racially and politically motivated violence and terror that infused the postCivil War South. Section 1 (later codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983) of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871 provided a federal remedy to those deprived of their constitutional rights by persons
acting under the color of law. Section 2 (later codified at § 1985(3)) was designed to punish,
criminally and civilly, conspiracies to deprive others of their constitutional rights. Randolph
M. Scott-McLaughlin, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: The Supreme Court's Next
Opportunity to Unsettle Civil Rights Law, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1357, 1371 n.49 (1992).
10. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 655 (1951), overruled by, Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971).
11. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
12. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837-39 (1983).
13. E.g., National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990),
rev'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 U.S.
753 (1993); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir.
1989) (conspiracies "directed against women are inherently invidious, and repugnant"), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1984) (conspiracies
based on sex come within the purview of § 1985(3)); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978) (gender is within the scope of § 1985(3)), vacated
on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
14. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
15. Id. at 759.
16. Although I attempt to draw a parallel between the acts of violence and harassment
faced by blacks in the nineteenth century and those faced by women seeking abortions today,
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This Comment critically analyzes the Bray decision and concludes that
the plurality opinion, written by Justice Scalia, ignores the legislative intent, history, and plain meaning behind § 1985(3). The Bray decision curtails the natural evolution of the statute and denies women protection
from the acts of violence and intimidation perpetrated against them.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Ku Klux Klan Act

The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871.17 This Act was originally drafted in response to the Ku Klux
Klan's reign of terror in the post-Civil War South.1 8 The Klan used violence and terror against blacks and Republicans in an effort to further
their political objectives. 19 Murders, whippings, hangings, and arson were
common tactics used by the Klan to keep blacks from voting and to keep
20
others from supporting the Republican party and its political agenda.
As violence in the South escalated, many members of Congress felt
that state governments were either unable or unwilling to protect their
citizens from the violence of the Ku Klux Klan. 21 Under existing law, the
this comparison is in no way intended to convey the lawless acts women and doctors face
today are on the same level as the atrocities and systematic persecution blacks faced in the
Reconstruction Era South. I attempt to show that this persecution of women at the hands of
radical political factions today reflects the situation in 1871 sufficiently to fall within the purview of the civil rights statute.
17. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1988)). The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 is the forefather of much of our modem
civil rights legislation. From this Act emerged: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (civil liability for
deprivation of federally protected rights under the color of state law); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1988) (civil liability for conspiracy to deprive of equal protection of the laws); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1988) (attorney's fees for proceedings in vindication of civil rights); 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1988) (criminal conspiracy provision). Ken Gormley, Private Conspiraciesand the Constitution:
A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEx. L. REv. 527, 540-41 n.31 (1985).
18. See generally Scott-McLaughlin, supranote 9, at 1362-72 (discussing why Congress felt
a need to respond to the Ku Klux Klan).
19. The Klan was comprised mainly of disgruntled southerners after the Civil War who
were opposed to freeing the slaves and who resented the federal government and Lincoln's
Republican party. See Gormley, supra note 17, at 534-35.
20. Id.
21. Many members of the Klan were, in fact, local law enforcement officers. Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 1361.
Representative Jeremiah Wilson of the Forty-Second Congress felt that it was the purpose of the Klan to thwart and overthrow local officials. He testified that the Klan existed:
for the express purpose of controlling government in the States ... by preventing
citizens from exercising their legitimate constitutional privileges. It is to overthrow
by force and violence political opinion; it is to destroy by violence the freedom of
the ballot box, and therefore it is the most dangerous form of domestic violence
and rebellion against the laws.
CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 484 (1871) [hereinafter CONG. GLOBE].
Representative John Coburn also expressed the fear of lawlessness in the South. He
explained that
there is a preconcerted and effective plan by which thousands of men are deprived
of the equal protection of the laws. The arresting power is fettered, the witnesses
are silenced, the courts are impotent, the laws are annulled, the criminal goes free,
the persecuted citizen looks in vain for redress. This condition of affairs extends to
counties and States; it is, in many places, the rule, and not the exception.
Id. at 459.
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federal government had no specific power to intervene. To remedy this
lack of power, the Reconstruction Congress produced a series of enactments intended to protect civil rights at the federal level. 22 From this congressional action emerged § 1985(3), which, as part of the Ku Klux Klan
Act, was designed to guard against private deprivations of equal protection. 23 In defense of Congress' power to enact such a statute, supporters
of the bill asserted that the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments constituted a fundamental shift in power from the
states to the national government. 24 These supporters urged that protection of citizens' rights was no longer solely within the province of the
states, but that Congress' power was now enlarged to address the deprivation of civil rights at the federal level. 25
B.

Intended Scope of Section 1985(3)

As originally introduced in the Forty-second Congress, the Ku Klux
Klan Act was a broad criminal provision intended to cover any acts that
violated the rights, privileges, or immunities of another person.2 6 Fearful
of the Act's unlimited scope, legislators pushed for its amendment. 27 The
amended version retained the criminal provision and added a civil cause
of action for persons injured by the conspiratorial actions of private parties. 28 Under this amendment, the bill was limited to private conspiracies
22. The Reconstruction Congress passed five major pieces of civil rights legislation: Act
of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1988)) (protecting
voting rights); Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 337 (held unconstitutional in part in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1984 (1988)) (prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations); Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988)) (the Ku Klux Klan Act); Act of Apr. 9,
1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (outlawing
Black Codes in the former Confederate states); Act of Feb. 28; 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433,
repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (protecting voting rights).
23. The conditions in the South demonstrated the rights secured by the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were in jeopardy. Congress' actions reflect a belief
in its own power to punish both private and state actors who deprived others of the rights
secured by those amendments. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 153; see also supra note 9.
24. Id. at app. 149-50.
25. Id.
26. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971) (citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21,
at app. 68); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
27. As originally introduced into the House of Representatives, section two of the Ku
Klux Klan Act was a federal criminal statute with a list of actionable offenses. This section was
so broad that virtually every backyard conspiracy between two individuals could be deemed a
violation of federal law. The amendment removed the list of actionable crimes and proclaimed the act must be one that seeks to deprive a person of some protected right because
of his or her membership in a particular class. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825, 841-46 (1983) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
28. Representative Shellabarger explained that:
[t]he object of the amendment is ... to confine the authority of this law to the
prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down
the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his
and other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies of this section.
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 478.
The amendment added the critical language, which was eventually incorporated into
§ 1985(3), that imposes liability on persons who "conspire together for the purpose, either
directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection
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which are aimed at particular classes of citizens, and which seek to strip
from those classes the equal protection of the laws. 29 The amendment was
thus designed to allay the fears of the legislators that this statute would
30
become a general federal tort remedy.
It remained, however, the intent of Congress in 1871 to create a powerful tool to combat private conspiracies. 3 ' Congress sought to provide a
remedy for any class of people who became the target of a conspiracy by
an organization or group whose intent was to deprive that class of their
privileges and immunities. 3 2 While sponsors of the Ku Klux Klan Act referred to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as potential sources of Congress' power, no supporter indicated any intention
to limit the application of the statute to conspiracies motivated only by
racial animus. 33 Thus, any conspiracy directed at a group or class of people, with the intent and animus necessary to deprive that group or class of
their constitutional rights, would fall within the reach of § 1985(3).
C.

The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Section 1985(3)

From the time of its inception, § 1985(3) has not been allowed to
serve its intended purpose. 3 4 The civil component of the statute lay dormant for nearly seventy years, due largely to the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Harris.35 In Harris,the Court declared the criminal counterpart to § 1985(3) unconstitutional, as it exceeded Congress' powers
under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.3 6 The
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." Carpenters,463 U.S. at 844
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting § 1985(3)).
29.

CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 478.

30. See Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 841-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. In addressing the proposed amendment to the original bill, Representative Shanks
proclaimed that "I do not want to see (this measure) so amended that there shall be taken
out of it the frank assertion of power of the national Government to protect life, liberty, and
property, irrespective of the act of the State." CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at app. 101.
32. See Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 1372.
33. The legislators agreed that the Ku Klux Klan Act was designed to remedy deprivations of rights of all classes of citizens whether by the Klan or some other organization. See
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. CL 753, 800-01 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at app. 153-54 (statement of Rep. Garfield) (legislation protects "particular classes of citizens" and "certain classes of individuals"); i. at app.
267 (statement of Rep. Barry) ("white or black, native or adopted citizens"); i. at app. 376
(statement of Rep. Lowe) ("all classes in all States; to persons of every complexion and of
whatever politics"); i. at app. 190 (statement of Rep. Buckley) ("yes, even women")).
Senator Edmunds of Vermont stated that if "it should appear that this conspiracy was
formed against this man because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a
Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter... then this section
could reach it." CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 567.

34. See Gormley, supra note 17, at 541 & n.32 (describing the period between 1873 and
1883 as the "Dreadful Decade" in which the Court was hostile to the civil rights statutes of the
Reconstruction Era. The Justices during this time were concerned with protecting the power
of the states, were impatient with civil rights issues, and "refused to grant Congress broad
power to enforce the civil rights of individuals").
35. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
36. Id. at 641. Harris involved twenty men who removed four prisoners from jail and
beat them. They were charged under § 5519, the provision under which the criminal component of the Ku Klux Klan Act was codified. The civil provision was designated as § 1985(3) in
the 1979 United States Code. The Court in Harrisdeclared that § 5519 exceeded Congress'
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modern-day Supreme Court, in addressing the civil component of
§ 1985(3), has added and removed certain restrictions to the application
of § 1985(3), but the Court has consistently denied the broad interpretation and liberal application intended by the Forty-second Congress.
The Supreme Court first addressed the civil portion of § 1985(3) in
1951 in Collins v. Hardyman.3 7 The plaintiffs in Collins were residents of
California and members of a political club.3 8 Defendants, who opposed
the plaintiffs' political views, conspired to interfere with and prevent a
club meeting.3 9 The conspirators assaulted members of the club and used
other violent means to break up the meeting. 40 The plaintiffs argued that
the conspirator's actions violated their rights to peaceably assemble and
41
petition the federal government for redress of grievances.
In this initial interpretation, the Court held state officials must be involved in the conspiracy in order to invoke § 1985(3).42 Although the
plaintiffs did not allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation, 43 the Court
considered the statute pursuant to Congress' power under that amendment. The majority opinion determined that since § 1985(3) derived its
power from the Fourteenth Amendment, the statute protected only
against state action. 44 The dissent, however, viewed § 1985(3) more
broadly and asserted that Congress had the power, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, to prevent private parties from infringing upon constitutional rights. 45 By ignoring legislative history and intent, and reading
a state action requirement into the civil conspiracy section, the Collins
Court, in effect, put private conspiracies to deprive people of their civil
46
rights out of the reach of the statute.
In 1971, twenty years after Collins and one hundred years after
§ 1985(3)'s inception, the Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge47 gave § 1985(3)
some teeth by eliminating the restrictive interpretation placed on the statute in Collins. Griffin involved several black motorists who were stopped on
a highway in Mississippi by a group of white men who mistakenly believed
power under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and was therefore un-

constitutional. Id. at 644.
37. 341 U.S. 651 (1951), overruled by Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
38. Id. at 653.
39. Id. at 654.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 655.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 658. There was much debate among legislators in 1871 regarding the Fourteenth Amendment's relationship to § 1985(3). A review of these legislators' positions
reveals that Congress intended to protect rights that flowed from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments, and not the Fourteenth Amendment alone. Many of the speakers asserted that § 1985(3) would address any violation of equal protection or denial of any
privilege and immunity and, as such, the statute was not limited to deprivations of purely
Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 1364.
45. Collins, 341 U.S. at 663-64 (Burton, Black & Douglas, 1J., dissenting).
46. See Helyn S. Goldstein, Note, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: The Scope of
Section 1985(3) After Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 61 B.U.
L. REv. 1007, 1008 (1981).
47. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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that one of the black men was a civil rights worker. 48 The plaintiffs were
threatened, held at gunpoint, and beaten. 49 Griffin and the other black
occupants of the car brought suit in federal court under § 1985(3). They
alleged a conspiracy to deprive them of the equal protection of the laws of
the United States and Mississippi, including the right to First Amendment
freedoms, the right not to be enslaved, the right to life and liberty, and the
right to travel public highways. 50
The Court looked to the plain meaning of § 1985(3) and held that it
51
did, and was intended to, provide protection from private conspiracies.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, declared that many of the constitutional problems perceived in Collins regarding congressional power and
state action did not exist and that the statute should be given a sweep as
broad as its language. 52 However, Stewart and the majority in Griffin then
proceeded to fashion their own constraints on the application of
§ 1985(3).
Wary that the imprecise wording of the statute would allow it to become a general federal tort remedy, 53 the Court developed the requirement that a plaintiff prove a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." 54 In
addition, the Griffin court required the source of Congress' power to remedy the particular deprivation be identified. 55 The plaintiff's claims in this
case were justified under the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to
travel. 56 The Court, however, was careful to explain that "[i] n identifying
these two constitutional sources of congressional power, we do not imply
the absence of any other."57 Justice Stewart was inferring that the Fourteenth Amendment could be a viable source of Congress' power, but not
in the case at hand.5 8
48. Id. at 90.
49. Id. at 91.
50. Id. at 90-92.
51. Id. at 96.
52. The Court explained that other civil rights statutes from the Reconstruction Era had
been given "a sweep as broad as their language" and that § 1985(3) should as well. Id. at 97.
53. Id. at 102. The Court noted that "[t]he constitutional shoals that would lie in the
path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full
effect to the congressional purpose." Id.; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
54. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. The "invidiously discriminatory animus" requirement established that a prejudicial reason for the conspiracy must exist. This language was intended to
give the statute the meaning intended by the authors of the original limiting amendment.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Bruce Brown, Injunctive Relief and Section
1985(3): Anti-Abortion Blocaders Meet the "Ku Klux Klan Act", 39 BuFF. L. REv. 855, 859 (1991).
55. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104.
56. Id. at 105-06. The Court recognized the right to travel in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1968). "[Tlhe constitutional right to travel from one State to another.., occupies
a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly
established and repeatedly recognized." Id. at 630 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757-58 (1966)).
57. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 107.
58. The "Enabling Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment states "[tlhe Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5. The Court implied that the Enabling Clause might give Congress the
power to reach private conspiracies of all kinds and not just those aimed at racial groups.
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Griffin left two important questions unanswered. First, lower courts,
when interpreting § 1985(3), would need to determine whether an "otherwise class-based" animus included discriminatory intent other than racial
bias. 59 Second, considerable doubt still existed as to the existence of the
state action requirement. Griffin was a race discrimination case based on
the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel. If the discrimination
extended to groups such as women, homosexuals, or religious groups, the
Fourteenth Amendment, with its explicit state action requirement, would
be implicated. The Griffin Court inferred, but failed to state explicitly,
that the Fourteenth Amendment could serve as a source of power for Congress to remedy private deprivations of constitutional rights. 60 This gave
the lower courts great latitude in interpreting § 1985(3) and Griffin's requirements. 61 Some federal courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, attempted to limit the reach of § 1985(3) by reviving a state action
requirement;62 yet others, such as the Eighth Circuit, found no difference
between conspiracies grounded in the Thirteenth Amendment and those
based on the Fourteenth, so long as both were fueled by invidious
63
discrimination.
As the lower federal courts struggled to sort out these complex issues
involving racial and "otherwise class-based" discrimination, a state action
requirement, and the source of congressional power, the Supreme Court
had its next opportunity to address the scope and application of
§ 1985(3). In 1983, the Court, in United Brotherhood of Carpenters,Local 610
v. Scott,6 4 examined the two important questions left unanswered in Griffin. The plaintiffs in Carpenters, nonunion construction workers, were victims of mob violence and harassment by local residents and union
members. 65 These nonunion members alleged that a group had conspired against them because of their refusal to join a union and that they
66
were denied their First Amendment associational rights.
In addressing the question of which classes the statute should protect,
the Court did not go so far as to specifically limit a § 1985(3) action only
to racial groups. However, it did prohibit extension of the statute to reach
conspiracies based on an economic animus. The Court recognized that
legislative intent promised a broad reach to the statute, but quickly dis[T] he allegations of the complaint in this case have not required consideration of
the scope of the power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. By
the same token, since the allegations of the complaint bring this cause of action so
close to the constitutionally authorized core of the statute, there has been no occasion here to trace out its constitutionally permissible periphery.
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 107.
59. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.9.
60. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Gormley, supra note 17, at 550-55.
62. E.g., Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972).
63. E.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
64. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
65. Id. at 827-28.
66. Id. at 829-30.
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missed this factor, stating that the "predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was
67
to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters."
Addressing the second question, regarding the existence of a state
action requirement, the Court held that First Amendment rights were protected through the Due'Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and thus required state action to invoke protection under § 1985(3).68 In
ruling that state action was necessary for a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court did not specifically overturn Griffin. The Court
distinguished the two cases by saying that, in Griffin, a § 1985(3) action was
properly maintained under a claim for deprivation of Thirteenth Amendment rights and the constitutional right to travel; 69 whereas in Carpenters,a
claim based on the deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights must include state action. 70 Although the decision in Griffin provided the option
of upholding federal claims under § 1985(3) via the Enabling Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in Carpenters chose to reestablish
the restrictive state action requirement.
The dissent in Carpenterscriticized the plurality for ignoring the legislative history and intent of the statute. The dissent argued that it was apparent from the remarks of the Forty-second Congress that no state action
requirement was intended 7' and pointed to the Griffin Court's explicit ruling that no state action requirement need exist. 7 2 The dissent also argued
that the statute was meant to reach any class that was deprived of their
constitutional rights. The language of the statute itself and the documented intentions of the Reconstruction Congress left no doubt in the
minds of the dissenters that § 1985(3) extended protection beyond racial
73
classes.
While the plurality in Carpenters explicitly denied protection to conduct motivated by economic animus, it was silent as to what classes, other
than racial groups, might be protected under the statute. This indecision
again left a great amount of discretion to the lower courts to determine
the scope of the statute. Several district and circuit courts have been willing to extend protection to groups that traditionally have faced class discrimination. Many lower courts have afforded protection under § 1985(3)
74
to groups bound by race, sex, religious affiliation, or ethnic origin.
Other courts have tried to stretch the scope of the statute even farther,
67. Id. at 836.
68. Id. at 830-31.
69. Id. at 832-33.
70. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
71. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 841-49 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & O'Connor, jJ.,
dissenting).
72. d. at 848-49.
73. Id. at 850-51.
74. E.g., Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45, 46-47 (4th Cir. 1981) (conspiracy to "deprogram"
members of the Unification Church), cet. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Fisher v. Shamburg,
624 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1980) (conspiracy to assault a black man at a roadside diner); Life
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1979) (conspiracy against female
insurance policy holders); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975) (implying that gender constitutes a cognizable class); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1059
(6th Cir. 1973) (conspiracy against members of the Jewish faith); Bergman v. United States,
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attempting to fashion more liberal and creative causes of action under
75
§ 1985(3).
The Supreme Court, in its limited dealings with § 1985(3), has been
far more hesitant to accord similar breadth to the statute. The Court has
never explicitly extended the statute to reach any classes other than racial
groups. The state action requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment
has alternately been insisted upon and denied by the Court. The inconsistent precedent set by the opinions in Griffin and in Carpenterson the issues
of state action and congressional power has left these issues open to interpretation. Since its enactment in 1871, the effectiveness of § 1985(3) has
slowly but surely been eroded at the hands of the Supreme Court. The
statute's decay culminated in the 1993 decision Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic76-the Court's most recent, and perhaps most devastating,
interpretation of § 1985(3).
II.
A.

BRAY v. ALE4ArDRmA

WOMEN'S HALT

C

rwVrc

Facts

Plaintiffs in Bray included nine clinics that provide abortions or abortion counseling, and five organizations that seek to establish and preserve
women's right to obtain an abortion. 77 Defendant Operation Rescue is a
group whose members oppose abortion and its legalization. 78 Operation
Rescue's principal goal is to stop abortion by any means necessary. It typically achieves this goal by demonstrations called "rescues," which consist of
of blockadintentionally trespassing on a clinic's premises for the purpose
79
ing entrances and exits, effectively closing the facility.
Members of Operation Rescue agree and combine with one another
at
to organize, coordinate, and participate in "rescue" demonstrations 80
clinics across the country, including the Washington metropolitan area.
Their goals in disrupting and blockading clinics are to (1) prevent abortions, (2) dissuade women from seeking the services of abortion clinics,
and (3) impress upon members of society the moral righteousness of their
8
anti-abortion views. '
In light of the increased number of "rescue" demonstrations in the
Washington metropolitan area,8 2 and indications that defendants had no
intention of abandoning their protests,8 3 plaintiffs filed for a permanent
551 F. Supp. 407, 415 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (conspiracy by members of the Ku Klux Klan and
others to attack "Freedom Riders" during trip through Alabama).
75. See generally Gormley, supra note 17, at 550-51.
76. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
77. Nat'l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd,
914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1488.
81. Id.
82. Almost weekly from 1984 to 1989, Commonwealth Women's Clinic was the target of
rescue" demonstrations by Operation Rescue. Id. at 1489.
83. Id. at 1490.
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injunction to enjoin defendant Operation Rescue and its members from
trespassing on or impeding or obstructing ingress to or egress from facilities providing abortion services and related counseling.8 4 Plaintiffs asserted five causes of action; two were federal claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) and the remaining three were pendent state claims for trespass,
public nuisance, and tortious interference with business.8 5
B.

Lower Courts

The federal district court, in National Organizationfor Women v. Operation Rescue,8 6 granted a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants
from continuing their "rescue" activities.8 7 The court determined that the
defendants engaged in a conspiracy for the purpose of depriving women
seeking abortions of the right to travel interstate. 88 The court found the
rescue demonstrations interfered with the right to travel because substantial numbers of women seeking the services of clinics in the Washington
metropolitan area travel interstate to obtain these services. 89 The court
based its decision on the premise that gender-based discrimination satisfies the class-based discriminatory animus element of § 1985(3),90 and
that seeking to deprive women of their right to travel interstate is therefore actionable under the statute. 9 1
Although the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had deprived
them of their right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment in seeking abortion services, the court chose not to base its decision on that
ground, relying instead on the deprivation of the plaintiff's right to interstate travel. The district court was reluctant to venture into the "thicket"
of abortion, because the "law concerning a putative abortion right is in a
state of flux," 9 2 and also because another independent ground for relief
existed under § 1985(3). 93 Thus, although the desired injunction was
84. Id. at 1486.
85. Id. at 1492.
86. 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), aftd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part
and vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
87. Id. at 1497. The court noted that, under Griffin, the elements of a cause of action
under § 1985(3) are:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4)
whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Id. at 1492 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971)).
In other words, plaintiffs in a § 1985(3) claim must show first that they are a class; second, that they have been deprived of a constitutionally protected right that Congress has the
power to redress; and third, that this deprivation was the result of an "invidiously discriminatory animus" as established in Griffin.
88. Id. at 1489.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1492.
91. Id. at 1493.
92. Id. at 1494. The court cited Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)
in alluding to the increasing number of restrictions on abortion. Nat'l Org. for Women, 726 F.
Supp. at 1494 n.13.
93. National Org.for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1494.
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granted, the district court expressed no view as to the plaintiff's claim
based on a fundamental right to abortion.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's opinion and the issuance of a permanent injunction. 94 The circuit court agreed with the district court that gender-based animus satisfies the "purpose" element of
§ 1985(3). 9 5 The circuit court also agreed that blocking access to abortion facilities that serve clients traveling from out of state is a violation of
the right to interstate travel, but, like the district court, declined to address
the issue of whether § 1985(3) encompasses a violation of the right to privacy.9 6 Upon reviewing the relevant points of law, the circuit court concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion and affirmed
97
the judgment of the district court in all respects.
C.

Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 25, 1991, in Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.98 The Bray Court had several issues to
determine en route to affirming or reversing the circuit court. First, the
Court had to determine whether the conspirators' actions stemmed from
"a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." Essential to that determination was deciding whether women seeking abortions constitute a
class. If so, the Court then would have to decide whether gender-based
discrimination fits within the scope of§ 1985(3). Finally, the Court had to
determine if the respondents were asserting and being deprived of any
constitutional rights enforceable by Congress. The rights implicated in
this case included the fundamental right to abortion and the right to
travel. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, 99 denied relief to respondents and gave the Reconstruction Era statute itsmost limiting interpretation and application since its inception over one hundred years ago.
1.

Plurality Opinion

Justice Scalia began by explaining that precedent established two elements must be shown in order to prove a private conspiracy in violation of
the first clause of § 1985(3).100 First, according to Griffin, "some racial, or
94. Nat'l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd
in part and vacated in part sum nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753

(1993).
95. Id. at 585. The court stated the Fourth Circuit had forecast this holding in Buschi v.
Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1257 (4th Cir. 1985) and that at least six circuits agreed. SeeNewYork
Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947
(1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Savings
& Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1244 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366
(1979); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 1520 (1st Cir. 1984); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt,

591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978).
96. Nat'7 Org.for Women, 914 F.2d at 586.
97. Id.
98. 498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
99. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.
100. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 757-58 (1993). The Court
differentiated between the first and second clauses of § 1985(3). The first clause of
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perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" must lie
behind the conspirator's actions. 10 1 Second, Carpenters established that
the conspiracy must be aimed at a right that is "protected against private,
as well as official, encroachment." 10 2 According to the plurality, respondents failed on both counts.
Justice Scalia first refuted the respondents' assertions that "opposition
to abortion" belongs alongside race discrimination as "an otherwise classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus."10 3 According to Scalia, opposition to abortion does not constitute discrimination against the "class" of
women seeking abortions. In fact, these women seeking abortions do not
constitute a class, even in a speculative extension of Griffin's "otherwise
class-based" requirement. 10 4 Justice Scalia argued that by allowing "women seeking abortion" to be labeled a class under § 1985(3), the statute
would become the "general federal tort law" that the statute's original
10 5
sponsors feared.
Despite respondents' assertion that this conspiracy affects the class of
"women in general," Scalia found nothing in the record to demonstrate
that petitioners' actions are directed at women in general.' 0 6 He determined that a class-based animus can only be established by showing either
that the opposition to abortion has a sex-based intent or that it has a sexbased effect.' 0 7 Justice Scalia argued that the petitioners' opposition was
grounded in matters other than animosity toward women, such as the
preference of childbirth over abortion, and therefore there was no sign
that the conspiracy was a product of the protesters' dislike of women as a
class. 10 8 Thus, there existed no discriminatory, sex-based intent. As to
whether petitioners' actions constituted class-based animus solely by effect,
Justice Scalia cited past precedent to show that the "disfavoring of abortion" is not ipso facto sex discrimination without the requisite element of
intentional, class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. 10 9 The plural§

1985(3), referred to as the "deprivation clause," describes a conspiracy "for the purpose of

depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." The second clause, referred to as the "hindrance" or "prevention" clause, adds "for the purpose of preventing or
hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1988). The Court interpreted and applied these two clauses in Bray.
101. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758; see supra text accompanying notes 53-58 and note 54.
102. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758; see supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
103. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
104. Id.
105. "Otherwise, innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able to assert causes of action
under § 1985(3) by simply defining the aggrieved class as those seeking to engage in the
activity the defendant has interfered with." Id.; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
106. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
107. Id. at 760.
108. Id. Justice Scalia stated that "there are common and respectable reasons for opposing [abortion], other than hatred of or condescension toward... women as a class-as is
evident from the fact that men and women are on both sides of the issue." Id.
109. Id. at 760-61. Justice Scalia cited several cases to illustrate his point that disfavoring
of abortion is not ipso facto sex discrimination: Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that abortion restriction issues are not viewed under heightened-scrutiny standards as are
other cases dealing with sex-based discrimination); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (also
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ity concluded there was no invidiously discriminatory animus that affected
women as a class, and therefore, the respondents failed to satisfy the re110
quirements set forth in Griffin.
Justice Scalia then addressed the issue of state action raised by the
Court in Carpentersi"' and determined the petitioners had not interfered
with any rights protected against private encroachment. He asserted that
an incidental infringement of the right to interstate travel is not sufficient
for a § 1985(3) claim. 112 The deprivation of that right must be the conscious objective of the group and not simply a circumstantial effect.' 13 In
addition, the right of interstate travel is not implicated at the federal level
unless the restriction is applied discriminatorily against travelers from another state or actual barriers are erected to interstate movement. 114 Thus,
according to Justice Scalia, the actions of petitioners in no way implicated
the right of interstate travel.
Justice Scalia next addressed the respondents' claim of a deprivation
of their right to obtain an abortion. He likewise dismissed this claim by
asserting the deprivation of that federal right is not remediable under
§ 1985(3) when it is produced by the object of a purely private conspiracy." 5 Justice Scalia argued that since the Court held in Carpenters that
the absence of state action barred a claim against the deprivation of First
Amendment rights, it would not make sense for the Court to allow such a
claim for abortion, a right which is less explicitly protected by the Constitution. 1 6 Thus, respondents failed to establish either a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus or the deprivation of a right protected against
private encroachment. Accordingly, Justice Scalia found no violation of
the first clause of § 1985(3), and held that respondents' "deprivation"
claim must fail.
Justice Scalia then quickly dismissed the issue of the second "hindrance" clause of § 1985(3). 117 Based on evidence that small, local police
holding that abortion restriction issues are not viewed under heightened-scrutiny standards);
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (denying an Equal Protection claim
against a Massachusetts law giving employment preference to veterans, over 98% of whom
were male); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment
claim against an insurance company for denying coverage for certain disabilities associated
with pregnancy).
110. By rejecting the claim that petitioners' opposition to abortion reflects an animus
against women in general, the Court avoided determining whether women, or any group
other than racial minorities, are a qualifying class under § 1985(3).
111. The Court in Carpentersheld that a § 1985(3) private conspiracy claim requires intent to deprive persons of a right guaranteed against private impairment. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at
762 (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)); see also
supra text accompanying notes 64-75.
112. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762-63.
113. "The right must be 'aimed a,' ..,its impairment must be a conscious objective of the
enterprise." Id. at 762 (citing Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833).
114. Id. at 763.
115. Id. at 764. The right to abortion is not a right that is protected against both federal
and private encroachment, as it is "one element of a more general right of privacy.., or of
Fourteenth Amendment liberty." Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 100.
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forces are often hindered or overrun by the mass demonstrations organized by Operation Rescue, respondents sought to invoke this clause on
reargument and in their supplemental brief. 11 Although several Justices
argued that relief could and should be granted on the basis of the hinderance clause, Justice Scalia claimed this second clause was not under review. 1 19 He mentioned, however, that if the second clause were invoked,
it would still "seem to require" the class-based discriminatory animus required under the first clause. 120 The Supreme Court then reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals, and left to the lower court on remand
the question of whether the pendent state claims alone justified the
injunction.
2.

Concurring Opinion

Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion claiming the different
interpretations of § 1985(3) offered by the dissenting Justices confirmed,
in his mind, the correctness of the Court's opinion. 12 1 A misinterpretation of this statute, he claimed, could make numerous "ordinary" state
crimes actionable under a federal statute enacted over one hundred years
ago. 122 Although Justice Kennedy viewed the petitioners' conduct as "persistent, organized, premeditated lawlessness" that "menaces in a unique
way the capacity of a State to maintain order and preserve the rights of its
citizens,"' 2 3 he concluded that there are other forms of federal assistance
12 4
that groups such as respondents can invoke.
3.

Justice Souter Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

Justice Souter began his opinion by asserting the case required interpretation of both clauses of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).125 Justice Souter agreed
with the majority's interpretation and application of the first clause of the
statute. He concurred finding the criteria, set forth in Griffin and
118. "Respondents sought to include a 'hindrance' clause section in their Supplemental
Brief of Reargument, but the Court declined to accept that section for filing." Bray, 113 S.
Ct at 765.
119. Id. at 764-65.
120. Id. at 765-66. "We said in Griffin that the source of the animus requirement is '[ t] he
language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities'
... and such language appears in the 'hindrance' clause as well." Id. (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
Justice Scalia went on to say that "[w ] ithout a race or class-based animus requirement, the
'hindrance' clause of this post-Civil War statute would have been an available weapon against
the mass 'sit-ins' that were conducted for the purposes of promoting' desegregation in the
1960's-a wildly improbable result." Id. at 766.
By addressing this clause "not on review,"Justice Scalia, through dictum, foreclosed any
possibility that future plaintiffs in a similar situation could successfully invoke the second
clause.
121. Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122. Id.

123. Id. at 769.
124. Justice Kennedy mentioned that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 10501 (1988), the Attorney General of the United States is empowered to put the full force of federal law enforcement resources at the disposal of the State. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 769 (KennedyJ., concurring).
125. Bray, 113 S. CL at 769 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Carpenters, necessary to invoke protection under the "deprivation"
clause. 12 6 Thus, the absence of a class-based discriminatory animus
aimed at the deprivation of a constitutional right that is protected from
private as well as state encroachment forced him to agree, in part, with the
majority.
Dissenting in part, Justice Souter maintained that the issue of the
"hindrance clause" was properly before the Court. He believed that the
question was presented broadly under the § 1985(3) claims. 1 2 7 As the
Court had not previously addressed the hindrance clause and was not officially addressing it in this decision, Justice Souter attempted to clarify what
he considered to be the clause's proper interpretation and application.
Justice Souter looked to legislative intent to argue that the class-based
discriminatory animus imposed on the first clause of the statute should
not be applied to the second. 128 He believed a similar limiting construction would render the statute inoperable. For example, the restrictions
placed on the deprivation clause by the Court in Griffin and Carpenters"almost certainly narrowed that clause from the scope Congress had intended." 12 9 Justice Souter seemed reluctant to let the Court impose a
similarly unintended restriction on the hindrance clause. He concluded
by saying the Court should vacate the decision and remand for a final
determination of whether this conspiracy is actionable under the hindrance clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).130
4. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens was one of three Justices to fully dissent in the Bray
decision.13 1 Justice Stevens argued that the Court ignored § 1985(3)'s history, intent, and plain language and relied on misplaced precedent in its
opinion. He determined that the narrow interpretation given to the statute in Griffin and Carpenterswas done to avoid what were perceived as constitutional problems with the statute itself. As these problems no longer
existed, 132 the statute should be interpreted to "reach current concerns
133
without exceeding the bounds of its intended purposes."
126. Although Justice Souter abided by the precedent set in Griffin, he believed that the
restrictions to a § 1985(3) claim fashioned by this opinion run counter to the intentions of
Congress in 1871. Id. at 772.
127. Id. at 770.
128. While the limitations on the deprivation clause set by the Griffin court were a safeguard to the statute becoming a general federal tort law, no such danger exists with the
hindrance clause. The requirement of proving a conspiratorial purpose to "prevent or hinder the constituted authorities.., from giving or securing ... the equal protection of the
laws" is a sufficiently limiting requirement. Id. at 775.
129. Id. at 774.
130. Id. at 779.
131. Justice Blackmun joined with both Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor, who wrote
separate dissenting opinions.
132. Questions concerning the constitutional power of Congress in providing relief
under the statute are no longer an issue. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 95-96
(1971). Also, providing a remedy to the violent interference with women exercising their
right to travel interstate to obtain an abortion "presents no danger of turning the statute into
a general tort law." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 784-85 (Stevens & Blackmun,JJ., dissenting).
133. Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 783.
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Justice Stevens found no basis in the text of § 1985(3) for excluding
from its coverage any class of persons entitled to equal protection of the
laws. 1 3 4 Gender-based classifications, like racially based classifications,
have historically been subject to challenge on constitutional grounds.
Since Griffin does not explicitly exclude women from coverage under the
statute, the question remained whether the deprivation of a woman's right
to obtain an abortion, or to travel interstate to do so, is "class based" and
actionable under § 1985(3).
In addressing this question, Justice Stevens attacked the plurality's
reasoning in evaluating the elements of intent and effect in its determination of what constitutes class-based animus.1 3 5 He claimed that by opposing constitutionally protected conduct engaged in exclusively by one class
of people, the conspirators' intent to discriminate against that class is
readily apparent.' 3 6 In addition, the effect of this opposition or discrimination is felt only by that one group or class of people. Justice Stevens
concluded that it is undeniable "the conspirators' immediate purpose was
to affect the conduct of women." 13 7 Petitioners targeted these women
particularly because of their gender and their capacity to become pregnant and have abortions. Therefore, a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus against the respondents had certainly been demonstrated.
Justice Stevens also believed the respondents had clearly established a
violation of their right to interstate travel.' 3 8 He cited precedent in which
the Court explicitly held the right to enter another State to seek abortion
services protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 139 Making a
woman's destination inaccessible or unavailable after she has traveled long
distances for a single purpose is unquestionably a restriction on her constitutional right to interstate travel. Although the plurality insisted the "intent" requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 241 applies to its civil counterpart,
§ 1985(3),Justice Stevens asserted that it would be incorrect to assume the
requirement found in the criminal statute should be "glibly" incorporated
into the civil statute. 140 In fact, the language of § 1985(3) is obviously less
stringent, broadly describing a purpose to deprive another of a privilege
"either directly or indirectly." 14 '
Even though the majority chose not to address the issue of the hindrance clause, Justice Stevens felt the respondents had unquestionably established a claim under that provision. 142 By preventing law enforcement
officials from offering protection to women seeking to exercise their constitutional rights, petitioners' actions clearly implicate the hindrance
clause of § 1985(3). Justice Stevens, like Justice Souter, also argued that
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 785 (Stevens & Blacknun, 1J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 785-92.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 787.
Id. at 792.
E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 793 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 795.

DENVER UN/VERS/TY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2

the restrictions imposed by Griffin should not apply to the hindrance
clause. 143 Not only do the restrictions in Griffin specifically address the
deprivation clause of the statute ("the portion of § 1985(3) before us"1 44 ),
but the hindrance clause requires no further restrictions to achieve its
145
goals and to keep it from being a general federal tort law.
Justice Stevens concluded by accusing the Court of selectively employing its various approaches to statutory interpretation in order to give
§ 1985(3) its narrowest possible interpretation. 4 6 The fatal flaw in the
plurality opinion, according to Justice Stevens, was the Court's mistaken
assumption that this case was about the opposition to abortion and not
14 7
about the violent deprivation of constitutional rights.
5. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by justice Blackmun, wrote a brief but powerful dissent concluding that "petitioners' activities fall squarely within the
ambit" of § 1985(3).148 Justice O'Connor argued these activities satisfied
both clauses of the statute. She claimed that petitioners' purpose was to
directly deprive women of their ability to obtain abortion services and to
indirectly infringe on their constitutional right to travel interstate in seeking those services. 149 It was also evident from the record, according to
Justice O'Connor, that local law enforcement officials have been hindered
in or prevented from maintaining open access to the clinics 150 and a safe
environment for their clients.
Justice O'Connor, along with Justices Souter and Stevens, looked to
the legislative history of the statute and determined the lawlessness and
violence exhibited by petitioners is just the scenario the authors of
§ 1985(3) wished to prevent. 15 1 Although Justice O'Connor viewed Griffin's imposition of the class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus requirement as a rational attempt to keep the statute from becoming the
federal tort law feared by the sponsors, 152 she asserted that the decision in
Carpenterswas misguided in denying protection to groups based on characteristics other than race.' 5 3 Justice O'Connor believed the scope of
§ 1985(3) should be as broad as was intended by Congress in 1871. The
Court's approach to Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes has historically
been to "accord [them) a sweep as broad as [their] language." 15 4
Ac143. Id. at 797.
144. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971).
145. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 797 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
146. Id. at 798-99 n.37.
147. Id. at 798.
148. Id. at 799 (O'Connor & Blackmun, f., dissenting).
149. Id. at 799-800.
150. Id. at 800.
151. Id. at 801.
152. Id. at 800.
153. Id. at 801.
154. Id. at 799 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)) (alteration in
original). In Bray, however, "the Court does just the opposite, precluding application of the
statute to a situation that its language clearly covers." I
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cordingly, Justice O'Connor determined that, at the very least, the classes
protected by the statute must encompass those groups that merit heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 155 Gender, she argued, most certainly falls within those
bounds. 156
Justice O'Connor found the petitioners' activities exhibited a discriminatory animus, regardless of the motivation behind their actions. 157 She
noted the sincerity of their opposition to abortion "cannot surmount the
manner in which they have chosen to express it."158 In addition, the
Fourteenth Amendment should not bar § 1985(3) from providing protection to respondents. Unlike Justice Scalia and the majority, Justice
O'Connor viewed the statute as a complement to the Fourteenth Amendment and not as its twin. Thus, she saw no reason to hold a § 1985(3)
plaintiff to the same constitutional standard of invidious
159
discrimination.
Justice O'Connor concluded that § 1985(3) was "intended to provide
a federal means of redress to the targets of private conspiracies seeking to
1 60
accomplish their political and social goals through unlawful means."
Thus, protection under the statute exists when "private conspirators target
their actions at members of a protected class, by virtue of their class characteristics, and deprive them of their equal enjoyment ofthe rights ac16 1
corded them under law."
III.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court has limited the interpretation of § 1985(3) since
the statute's inception in 1871. Over the past century, the meaning and
scope given to this Civil War statute by the Court have been inconsistent
and indecisive. The Court inserted and removed, and then inserted again,
certain restrictions until the precise meaning of the broadly worded statute was up for grabs. It is certain, however, that the statute has not become what its creators intended.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic gave the Supreme Court the
opportunity to once again interpret the language of the statute, along with
its legislative history and intent, and correctly apply it to the situation at
hand. Instead of allowing the statute to remedy the type of situation for
which it was intended, the Court denied protection from a private conspiracy that is strikingly similar to the one faced by Black Americans in 1871.
The Court's decision included a narrow interpretation of the legal issues,
155. Id. at 801.
156. Justice O'Connor cited several circuit courts that reached the conclusion that the
class of "women" falls within the protection of§ 1985(3). Id. at 801; see also supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
157. Bray, 113 S. CL at 802-03 (O'Connor & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
158. Id. at 802.
159. Id. at 803.
160. Id. at 805.
161. Id. at 804.

DENVER UNIVERS/TY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2

a complete disregard for the history and intent of the statute, and a failure
to consider the dangerous legal and social repercussions of the decision.
A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
1.

Class-Based Animus Requirement

The Griffin Court stressed that § 1985(3) may not be construed as "a
general federal tort law," 16 2 because the limiting language "requiring intent to deprive of equalprotection, or equal privileges and immunities" necessitates a demonstration of "some racial, or perhaps otherwise classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' actions." 163 This limiting language was a rational response to congressional
concern over the enormous sweep of the original criminal provision in the
Ku Klux Klan Act. 164
In Bray, Justice Scalia denied that respondents had established a classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus. He determined the group of
"women seeking abortions" does not constitute a class. In addition, "opposition to abortion" does not constitute discrimination against "women as a
class." In his view, this discrimination can only be shown by a "sex-based
intent" or discriminatory "effect." Finding neither present, Justice Scalia
concluded the petitioners' actions could not constitute a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.
The Court misinterpreted both the identity of the class and the nature of the protesters' animus in this case. The Court viewed the respondents as "women seeking abortion" rather than simply "women in
general;" choosing to define petitioners' actions as simply "opposition to
abortion"-alluding to a peaceful display of political difference-rather
than recognizing petitioner's violent intentions and the discriminatory effect of their actions.
Justice Scalia refused to acknowledge that, because only women can
become pregnant and only women can have abortions, it is necessarily the
class of "women in general" being affected. He narrowed the identity of
the group by claiming they are "women seeking abortions," ignoring the
fact that the constitutional right to abortion is available to all women,
whether they choose to exercise it or not. Operation Rescue and similar
organizations have the ultimate goal of denying each and every woman the
right to an abortion, regardless of whether she appears at a clinic. By
identifying these women as "a group of people who wish to engage in a
particular activity," Justice Scalia ignored the larger implications of his actions-effectively denying all women the protection of their constitutional
rights.
Justice Scalia attempted to bolster this narrow interpretation by proclaiming that "[t] he approach of equating opposition to an activity (abortion) that can be engaged in only by a certain class (women) with
162. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
163. Id.
164. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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opposition to that class leads to absurd conclusions. On that analysis, men
and women who regard rape with revulsion harbor an invidious anti-male
animus." 165
It is Justice Scalia's analogy, however, that proves nearer to
the absurd. While it is true that most rapists are male and rape victims
female, it is certainly possible for a woman to rape a man, or for a woman
to rape another woman, or even for a man to rape another man.
Justice Scalia's analogy, moreover, avoided again the fact that petitioners' opposition to this activity, in effect, denies to an entire class a
constitutionally protected right. To deny women the exercise of their constitutional right to abortion is to deny an entire class. It matters not the
intent of Operation Rescue or their feelings toward women. The problem
that exists, and the real issue to be examined, is the discriminatory effect
of their actions.
By not identifying the group seeking relief as women in general, the
plurality avoided answering one of the most important questions left open
in Griffin. If the Court had found that women "as a class" were invoking
protection under § 1985(3), the Court would have been forced to determine, for the first time, if gender properly comes within the purview of the
statute. It would be logical to assume that § 1985(3) provides protection
to those groups the Court has already determined merit heightened scru16 6
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Ever wary of extending civil rights protection, however, the Rehnquist
Court effectively narrowed the issues and curtailed its analysis enough to
avoid having to do so.
The Rehnquist Court has never been a champion of civil rights. In its
effort to deny the expansion of civil rights to groups such as women,
homosexuals, and ethnic minorities, the Court has, in the past, employed
the same tactics used by Justice Scalia in the Bray decision. The issues are
narrowed until the Court apparently has no choice but to rule against expanding civil rights. For example, in 1986, the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick 1 67 denied the extension of the constitutional right of privacy to
homosexuals. Justice White based his majority opinion on the fact the
Constitution does not confer on homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. But as the dissent in Bowers pointed out, "[t]his case is no
more about a 'fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy' ...
than Stanley v. Georgia ...was about a fundamental right to watch obscene
68
movies."1
Similarly, Bray is not a case simply about the right to abortion or the
desire to engage in the activity of abortion. It is about the violent deprivation of the constitutional rights of a cognizable class of persons. Moreover, Bray is not about the petitioners' opposition to abortion. It is about
165. Bray, 113 S. CL at 761 n.4.
166. See supra note 154-56 and accompanying text.
167. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
168. Id. at 199 (citations omitted); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the possession and reading of obscene materials in the home).
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the manner in which they choose to express that opposition. By not addressing the real issues before the Court, the plurality denied once again
the extension of civil rights, left unanswered the questions surrounding
§ 1985(3), and thwarted the intent of the Reconstruction Congress to provide protection against mob violence.
2.

Rights Protected Against Private Encroachment

The respondents asserted they were deprived of two constitutional
rights: the right to travel interstate and the right to abortion. Justice Scalia
concluded that petitioners had not interfered with any rights protected
against private as well as official encroachment.
The right to travel needs no state action requirement and can be the
object of a purely private conspiracy. It was on this ground that the lower
courts granted relief to respondents. The plurality in Bray, however, reversed the injunction on grounds that the deprivation of this right must be
the conscious objective of the group and not simply a circumstantial
effect.
In addition, the deprivation of the right to an abortion cannot, according to Justice Scalia, be the object of a private conspiracy. He explained the right to abortion is based on a more general right to privacy
and on Fourteenth Amendment liberties. After only a cursory analysis,
Justice Scalia concluded that Fourteenth Amendment liberties such as the
one respondents asserted simply cannot be protected from purely private
conspiracies.1 69 Justice Scalia's analysis, however, failed to address both
the legislative intent behind the statute and the Court's precedent regarding congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The records of the congressional debates in 1871 demonstrate that
§ 1985(3) was fashioned as a necessary corollary to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Using language similar to that of the amendment, the drafters intended the statute to protect against private conspiracies that could
deny equal protection as effectively as any state action.1 70 Many legislators
believed that Congress had the power to punish private individuals who
deprived others of the rights secured by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments.1 7 1 Much of the debate actually focused on
whether Congress had this power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The prevailing view was that southern states, by failing to convict or punish
Klan members for their crimes, were encouraging the violence or, at the

169. The lower courts granted relief under the right to interstate travel and therefore did
not need to address the question of abortion and congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
170. Gormley, supranote 17 at 550.
171. See supra note 44.
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very least, acquiescing to it. 1 7 2 Congress was therefore empowered to act
73
in place of the states when the states failed to protect their citizens.'
Modern precedent supports the principle that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress "to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights,
whether or not state officers or others acting under the color of state law
are implicated in the conspiracy." 174 Although the text of the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that
only governmental actions are restricted, the Court has, in the past, subscribed to a theory of congressional power that allows Congress to subject
some private conduct to Fourteenth Amendment limitations. 17 5 These
cases support the idea that even under the narrowest reading of Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, proscription of private conduct is proper
as an auxiliary remedy in order to ensure that individuals are able to exer176
cise their right to equal treatment.
Most recently, the Court in Griffin intimated that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment could be a source of congressional power to regulate private conspiracies. 177 Unfortunately, in the subsequent decisions of
Carpenters and Bray the Court declined to grant relief on this basis. It
would be consistent, however, with both legislative history and precedent,
for the Court to hold that states have an affirmative obligation to regulate
certain forms of private conduct, and when they fail to do so, Congress can
substitute its own regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment. 178 Just as
Congress provided protection to blacks when the states failed to do so,
Congress should also afford women, as the targets of unfettered private
179
conspiracies, remedies at the federal level.
172. "A systematic failure to make arrests, to put on trial, to convict, or to punish offenders against the rights of a great class of citizens is a denial of equal protection... and justifies
the active interference of the only power that can give it. .. " Scott-McLaughlin, supra
note 9, at 1374 n.55 (citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 459) (alteration in original).
...

173. "It may be safely said, then, that there is a denial of the equal protection of the law
by many of these States. It is therefore the plain duty of Congress to enforce by appropriate
legislation the rights secured by this clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution." Id.

174. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSrrrTUONAL LAw § 5-15 (2d ed. 1988)(citing
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)); see also supra note 58.
175. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (holding that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (declaring that Congress possesses the power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere
with Fourteenth Amendment rights regardless of state action); District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973) (dictum) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment itself "erects no
shield against merely private conduct"); Brewer v. Hoxie Sch. Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th
Cir. 1956) (holding that federal courts have power to enjoin private action designed to prevent school boards from furnishing unsegregated education).
176. TRsaE, supra note 174, § 5-15.

177. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Legislative History and Intent

Never before in interpreting § 1985(3) had the Court been presented
with a situation that so closely resembled the events in 1871. The problem
faced by society in the post-Civil War South was both politically and socially
based. A class of people were being violently deprived of their constitutional rights. As much of this problem was due to political differences as
was due to bigotry and hatred. The issues surrounding abortion are also
political in nature. Just as there were differences in opinion in 1871 regarding slavery and suffrage, similar debate exists today over the legal, social, and moral implications of abortion.
The violence against blacks and their supporters in 1871 had escalated to a point where Congress was pushed into action. The violence
against women seeking to exercise their constitutional right to abortion
and their supporters has also escalated. 1 8 0 The conservative majority of
the Supreme Court, however, is unwilling to provide protection for these
women under the same statute enacted to protect blacks against violence
in the Reconstruction South. Justice O'Connor aptly concluded in her
dissent that the Ku Klux Klan Act:
was intended to provide a federal means of redress to the targets
of private conspiracies seeking to accomplish their political and
social goals through unlawful means. Today the Court takes yet
another step in restricting the scope of the statute, to the point
where it now cannot be applied to a modern-day
paradigm of the
18 1
situation the statute was meant to address.
C.

Implications and Alternatives

The ramifications of the Court's inaction will be severe. The
Supreme Court has, in effect, given a stamp of approval to organizations
such as Operation Rescue and their acts of violence and harassment. The
Bray decision sends a dangerous and far-reaching message to those who
insist upon denying the reproductive freedoms of women.
"Rescues" will certainly multiply and radical pro-life factions will continue their campaign of domestic terrorism with new fervor.18 2 Doctors
180. According to the National Abortion Federation, vandalism in the last year more than
doubled, and hate mail and harassing phone calls to clinics tripled. A total of eight death
threats were reported in 1992, and in the first three months of 1993 alone, there were fortythree. See MaryJordan & Don Phillips, Abortion Foe Arrested in Shooting,WASH. PosT, Aug. 21,
1993, at Al.
181. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 805 (O'Connor & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
182. According to the National Abortion Federation, violence against women and clinics
increased dramatically in the last year. The group recorded 93 acts of violence (including
vandalism, arson, bombing, assault, and death threats) against providers in 1991. In 1992,
the number rose to 186. Robin Abcarian, Doctor'sDeath Is a Call to Action, LA. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1993, at El; see also Amy Goldstein & Brooke A. Masters, Ruling Seen as Reviving Blockades Abortion Foes Hope to Gain Second Wind, WASH. Post, Jan. 14, 1993, at A10.
In response to the Bray decision, Randall Terry, the leader and founder of Operation
Rescue, declared that "the most potent weapon" pro-choice advocates "had against us was the
illegal use of the federal judiciary. That weapon was ... smashed to pieces. This is really
going to help us in our recruiting. Look out, here we come." Dick Lehr, Court Limits Protection from Abortion Protests,BosroN GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1993, at B1; see also Fred Bruning, Whatever
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will stop performing abortions for fear of suffering a fate similar to that of
Dr. David Gunn. 18 3 Women will have to travel far and wide to exercise
their constitutional right free from intimidation and harassment.
It is readily apparent that women who are being deprived of their
rights in a persistent and violent manner cannot look to the Supreme
Court for relief. Although the language of and intent behind § 1985(3)
seem sufficient to give women seeking abortions protection, the Supreme
Court interpreted the statute otherwise. Thus, in response to the Bray decision and similarly constricting civil rights interpretations by the Court,
the public has called for specific protection of their civil rights by the legislature. Congress and the new administration have been quick to act. The
President, the Attorney General, and many members of Congress support
measures that would make it a federal offense to impede women's access
to reproductive health care by means of violence and harassment. Pending legislation includes the Freedom of Choice Act and, most recently, the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act.18 4 These bills, if passed, will
make federal remedies available to women whom the Supreme Court has
failed to protect from interference with their constitutional right to
abortion.
In National Organizationfor Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,185 the Supreme
Court, in allowing petitioner's claim to go forward, opened another potential avenue of protection-the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.186
Similar to Bray, the petitioner health care clinics brought an action against
a coalition of anti-abortion groups, called the Pro-life Action Network
(PLAN), and alleged, among other things, that the respondents "were
members of a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics though
a pattern of racketeering activity." 187 The petitioners argued that the
PLAN constituted a racketeering "enterprise" for purposes of § 1962(c).
The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, finding that
§ 1962(c) required an economic motive requirement to "the extent that

Happened to Reasoned Debate?, MAcLEA~s, Apr. 12, 1993, at 11 (quoting Don Treshman, direc-

tor of another major anti-abortion group, Rescue America, who warns that if government
passes legislation limiting pro-life demonstrators "there no doubt will be an even more regrettable increase in the level of violence.").
183. See Stephen Nohlgren, Abortion Doctors in Demand, ST. PETERsBuRG TIMES, Aug. 26,
1991, at IA.
184. The Freedom of Choice Act, H.R. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would prevent
states from restricting the right to terminate a pregnancy before fetal viability or at any time
if a woman's life or health is in danger. See Abcarian, supra note 183.
Under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), the federal courts would have jurisdiction to order injunctive relief and damages
against persons who use intimidation, violence, and threats to settle disagreements, but First
Amendment protections would be available to those who oppose abortion in a peaceful manner. See Melich, supra note 4; see also Morella, supra note 1.
185. No. 92-780, 1994 WL 13716 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1994).
186. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
187. Scheidler, 1994 WL 13716, at *2.
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some profit-generating purpose must be alleged in order to state a RICO
18 8
claim."
In a unanimous decision written by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the Court
found "a requirement of economic motive [in § 162 (c) ] neither expressed
nor... fairly implied in the operative section of the Act." 189 Finding the
statutory language unambiguous, the Court held that Congress had not
required that an "'enterprise' in § 1962(c) have an economic motive."' 90
In finding no economic requirement, the Court held the petitioners could
maintain the RICO action, but still must prove that "respondents conducted the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." 19 1
Although the Court's decision did not primarily involve the issue of
abortion, it nevertheless provided abortion clinics a potentially powerful
weapon to combat the harassment they currently endure. Whether petitioners and future abortion clinics will be able to prove that anti-abortion
groups have conducted an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
and, in turn, whether such acts are fully protected First Amendment activity, is yet to be determined. 192 In the interim, the vehement condemnation of the Court's decision by anti-abortion groups indicates the potential
19 3
strength of RICO to halt the ongoing harassment.
CONCLUSION

The Ku Klux Klan Act was enacted in response to the lawless mob
violence in the post-Civil War South that law enforcement officials in the
states were either unable or unwilling to stop. Just as the issues of race,
slavery, and suffrage were explosive in the nineteenth century South, today's issues of privacy, abortion, and reproductive rights are equally volatile. The violence that ensues from this battle has gone virtually
unchecked. Women being deprived of their constitutional rights have
looked to § 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act for help. In Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, the Supreme Court denied them that help. Thus,
the protections envisioned by the Forty-second Congress, which should be
extended to groups such as women, gays, and ethnic minorities, are being
held hostage by a conservative Court.
188. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 943 (N.D. II1. 1991),
af'd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992). In affirming the district court's decision, the Seventh
Circuit held that "non-economic crimes committed in furtherance of non-economic motives
are not within the ambit of RICO." Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 629.
189. Scheidler, 1994 WL at *6.
190. Id. at **6-7.
191. Id. at *7.
192. See Scheidler, 1994 WL 13716, at *8 (Souter, J., concurring) (stressing the Court's
decision "does not bar First Amendment challenges to RICO's application in particular
cases."). The Supreme Court, however, soon will likely decide this issue. On January 21,
1994, the Court agreed to hear a free-speech challenge by anti-abortion demonstrators to a
court ordered injunction that created a protest-free buffer zone at an abortion clinic in Florida. See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, No. 93-880, 1994 U.S. Lexis 1317 (Jan. 21, 1994).
193. See Linda Greenhouse, Abortion Clinic's Upheld by Court On Racket Suits, N.Y. TimEs,
Jan. 25, 1994, at Al; Tamar Lewin, Anti-Abortion Protests to Continue, Groups Say, N.Y. TimEs,
Jan. 25, 1994, at AIO.
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It is therefore necessary to look to the legislature in hope that it will
be better able to reflect the voice and concerns of the people. Women
and other disadvantaged classes will also look to the new Administration to
mold the Supreme Court into a body that wishes to enforce and not deprive citizens of their civil and constitutional rights.
Lisa J Banks

